There may be an emerging story from Afghanistan that the Obama Administration is keeping from the public and media.  As I previously reported on July 2nd, President Obama has restricted air support for Marines who were engaged in close combat in Helmand Province, for fear of collateral damage.  It is too early to determine if this has had a negative effect on combat operations, but based on the high casualty rates coming from Afghanistan, one has to wonder if we are winning or losing the battle with the Taliban?

Very little uncontrolled information has been making its way from of the front lines.  What we do know is that there is a major NATO offensive in southern Afghanistan, lead by the US Marine Corps.  The DOD says that this mission is a security operation aimed at stabilizing the southern region of the country in the lead up to Presidential elections next month.  The reality of what is happening in southern Afghanistan may be very different than what is being reported by the White House.

Just prior to the start of the July offensive, a US Marine and three members of the Afghan security forces were captured by a combat arm of the Taliban.  There has been very little follow-up on this story by the US media, although the  Taliban leadership has hinted at negotiating a prisoner exchange.  Are the Marines searching for the American POW, is he alive and have we been in contact with the Taliban’s political leadership?  The most startling aspect of this story is that the Taliban were brazen enough to send its forces onto a US military base and capture these soldiers.  The enemy clearly has no fear of our training, bravery and weapons.

The most disheartening information trickling in from Afghanistan are the high casualty rates being reported by the DOD and NATO allies.  Searching through the DOD web statements on casualty numbers, there was nine separate statements posted in the first week of July, totalling 16 deaths.  Unknown are the number of injuries sustained by US servicemen, although it is believed that dozens of  Marines have sustained injuries from IUD’s and small arms combat in southern Afghanistan.  The British government has also reported an alarming increase in casualties, as at least seven have been reported in the first week of July.  The British military is active in many of the same southern communities as the US Marines. The Canadian military, concentrated in the southern Province of Kandahar, have also reported casualties from Afghanistan in the first week of July.  The Afghan government has not released casual number for Afghan security forces, although it is believed to substantially higher then NATO forces.  It is believed that desertion rates within the Afghan security forces range between 30% and 50%.

At the height of the Iraqi occupation campaign, an average (July, 2007) of 2.5-3.0 allied military personnel were being killed per day.  Totalling the NATO loses in Afghanistan two years later, one must pause with concern at the fact that the current death toll is exceeding the Iraq numbers.  Even more startling is the fact that the US military has 100,000 fewer troops deployed in Afghanistan today, as they did in Iraq two years ago, which means the Taliban is 2-3 times more successful in inflicting casualties on US military personnel, as the counter-insurgency did in Iraq.

The Obama administration and DOD have failed to adequately explain why casual rates in Afghanistan are increasing and why their direct engagement with Taliban forces are failing to net strategic gains for the NATO forces.  The explanation for the rise in casualty rates in Iraq in late 2006 and 2007, was that the US was fighting an unconventional, urban war, involving various different ethnic and political groups.  The Bush administration argued in favor of a new approach, led by General Petraeus, which ultimately succeeded.  Even though our nation, military and the Iraqi people owe General Petraeus a debt of gratitude for his successful vision and dedication to the military and political success in Mesopotamia, it does not provide the DOD and Obama administration with the right to withhold the true status and goals of the Afghan mission.

Should the Afghanistan war not be more attractive to US and NATO forces, with enemy combatants who choose to engage us outside of urban areas, with more traditional methods of combat?  What is the reason for the high casual rates and the lack of success in the southern Provinces?  Why are the Obama administration and DOD less forthcoming with their Afghan strategy?  The Petraeus/Iraq counter-insurgency strategy was written in the form of a novel and was open and transparent to the media and public.  One cannot say the same for the mission in Afghanistan.  In recent weeks, statements out of the Pentagon have provided us with clues on the challenges that face NATO forces.

At a briefing, Brigadier General Larry Nicholson stated;

“I’m not going to sugarcoat it. The fact of the matter is we don’t have enough Afghan forces – and I’d like more,” Nicholson said.

Did General Nicholson mean ‘Afghan’ forces, or allied forces?  Are they not one in the same?  This statement was clearly controlled by the political arm of US defense policy as to not raise questions on our true goals in Afghanistan.  Casualty rates will continue to rise and the administration will not be held accountable if the Republican leadership in Washington continues to refuse to provide oversight on the Afghan mission and strategy. One must wonder why the voices of Republican leadership remain silent, even though the White House is restricting air support for ground forces and according to General Nicholson, lacks the appropriate resources to achieve victory.

But, maybe that is the strategy in itself.  President Obama may be more interested in adopting the Korean war strategy of military containment and achieving peace through negotiations.  As Truman did in Korea, President Obama may be interested in only providing our military leaders with the bare necessities to protect one half of Afghanistan, for fear of widening the war beyond the borders of Pashtun controlled areas. If this is the strategy, I question whether General Petraeus is a willing accomplice?  Is he unwilling to follow General MacArthur and fall on the career ending sword of challenging his powerful and popular President?  Why was General Petraeus so forthright on the mistakes made and resources required to bring victory to the Iraq mission, yet he remains in the closet on the failures in Afghanistan?

If our goal is containment, due to the fear of a broader conventional war with Islamic nations, then be honest with Americans, our NATO allies and the Afghan people.  If the war has become a political one, then explain why our young men and women are dying.

Kristofer Lorelli can be contacted at lorville@rogers.com, on Facebook and twitter/Kris_Lorelli.